Cuba, of course,made the topical short list of gubernatorial-debate topics. There were no surprises.
Charlie Crist, as we’ve heard, has evolved into seeing the embargo for the counterproductive failure that it is. He wasn’t previously, as we know, this outspoken. Rick Scott, on the other hand, sees the embargo as supportable: sort of the karmic consequences of dictators getting their due.
“I believe in the embargo,” said Scott during the Telemundo debate in Miramar, “and here’s why: The Castro Brothers are terrorists.” Next piñataquestion.
Two points.
First, even if humane scenarios and hemispheric geopolitics don’t resonate, how about self-serving economic rationales?
“Let’s get to work,” as all-encompassing as that theme has been for Scott, obviously doesn’t trump the hard-line politics of influential, vendetta partisans such as (Rep.) Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, (Rep.) Mario Díaz-Balart and (Sen.) Marco Rubio. What an unlikely fourth amigo is Scott.
The economic embargo disadvantages this country, this state and this port city. It has cost, and continues to cost, jobs. Make that “jobs, jobs, jobs.” And now a con job. Qué hipócrita.
Second, let’s also keep this in mind. Ultimately the embargo is a Congressional call, although one that is susceptible, to say the least, to political pressure from the state most impacted. Heretofore, Tallahassee hasn’t helped.
But Washington could still do something beyond no-guts incremental changes.
For openers, the Obama White House doesn’t need congressional approval to formally remove Cuba from the State Department’s list of countries that are state sponsors of terrorism. That’s right, Cuba still shares a list with Iran, Sudan and Syria.
Democracy-challenged but unthreatening Cuba is on a menace list, but North Korea isn’t? Cuba is an adversary and “citadels of freedom,” such as Saudi Arabia and a gaggle of Middle Eastern “‘stans” are allies? It would be farcical were it not so foreboding as foreign policy.
Moreover, the Obama White House can do something else: Restore normal diplomatic relations. Congressional cooperation isn’t needed. It would, ironically, better position the U.S. to press the Cubans for democratic reforms.
This much remains clear–even after more than half a century of Cold War invective and politics. Two critical keys are the political will and common sense of the occupants of the White House and a certain governor’s mansion.